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Abstract. Unconventional monetary policy was implemented as a result of the financial crisis and resulted in rising 
asset prices in the stock markets. While the increase in asset prices is not exclusively triggered by unconventional 
monetary policy, central bankers accept that unconventional monetary policy has resulted in distributional effects 
on wealth, and that these are not negligible. What is missing are studies analyzing whether these non-standard 
monetary policies have different distributional effects on women and men. The intent of the paper is to interrogate 
whether unconventional monetary policy of central banks has a gender bias that operates in favor of men as gender 
and against women as gender. Relying on insights from feminist economics, the paper uses the results of the ECB 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) of 62,000 household across 15 euro-area countries. While 
the results are tentative, they show an asymmetric distributional gendered impact. Since the rich own more assets 
than the poor, and since monetary easing works in part by raising asset prices, these unconventional policies may 
unintentionally benefit the wealthier quintile (on average more male) at the expense of the poorer strata of society 
(on average more female). 
Keywords: Central European Bank; Unconventional Monetary Policy; Feminist Economics; Eurosystem Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS); Gendered Asset Bias and Gendered Wealth Inequality. 
[es] El impacto de la política monetaria no convencional sobre la desigualdad de género 
de la riqueza 
Resumen. La política monetaria no convencional fue implementada como resultado de la crisis financiera, resultando 
en precios crecientes de los activos en los mercados de valores. Mientras que este incremento en los precios de 
los activos no está causado exclusivamente por la política monetaria, los bancos centrales aceptan que la política 
monetaria no convencional ha causado efectos redistributivos sobre la riqueza, y que éstos no son despreciables. Sin 
embargo, son inexistentes los estudios que analicen si estas políticas monetarias no convencionales tienen diferentes 
efectos redistributivos entre mujeres y hombres. El objetivo de este artículo es cuestionar si la política monetaria 
no convencional tiene un sesgo de género que opera a favor del hombre como género y en contra de la mujer como 
género. Apoyándonos en las aportaciones de economistas feministas, el artículo emplea los resultados de la Encuesta 
del Eurosistema sobre la Situación Financiera y el Consumo de los Hogares (HFCS) realizada por el BCE sobre una 
muestra de 62.000 hogares de la UE-15. Si bien los resultados son tentativos, muestran un impacto redistributivo 
asimétrico en cuanto al género. Como las clases altas poseen más activos que las bajas y, como la política monetaria 
funciona en parte incrementando los precios de los activos, estas políticas no convencionales posiblemente beneficien 
de manera no intencional al quintil más adinerado (por lo general masculino) a expensas del estrato más pobre de la 
sociedad (por lo general femenino).
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1. Introduction
Thomas Piketty in his highly acclaimed book, 
Capital in the 21st Century (2014), catapulted 
the issue of inequality onto the agenda of ac-
ademia and politics, as well as onto the front 
pages of prestigious newspapers around the 
globe. Contrary to many mainstream econ-
omists, Piketty argued that the inequality of 
wealth is not due to market imperfections and 
absence of technological skills among the poor 
and lower middle-class, but stems from the 
logic of finance-dominated capitalism. Com-
mensurate with the political shift to lower tax-
ation since the early 1980s and the liberaliza-
tion of the financial markets since the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods System, inequality and 
the volatility of global financial markets has 
increased in comparison to the previous Trente 
Glorieuses (2014:15). Due to the financiali-
zation of the global economy (Epstein 2005), 
the growth in private wealth has created a sit-
uation in which the rate of return on capital is 
larger than the rate of growth of the economy 
(Piketty 2014). As a result, the distributional 
divergence of wealth has accelerated and in-
creased income inequality, precarious employ-
ment, and polarization among the rich and 
poor within and across countries on a global 
scale. In fact, the 2015 Oxfam Report shows 
that 62 individual people (of whom 53 are 
men) owned as much wealth as the poorer half 
of the world population (around 3,6 billion) 
in 2015. In 2010, the figure was 388; and in 
2014, 80 people possessed as much wealth as 
the poorer half of the global population. The 
wealth of the richest people grew by about 45 
per cent in only five years (Oxfam 2016). 
One important and still contested factor, al-
beit not the only one, is the introduction of the 
unconventional monetary policies of the cen-
tral banks in high-income countries. This in-
volves purchases of large-scale assets to stim-
ulate economic growth by keeping the credit 
market functioning and interest rates low 
(Goodhart et al., 2014). As investment oppor-
tunities are drying up and profit margins are 
falling as a result of the so-called secular stag-
nation, (Summers 2014) one of the few games 
left in town is to use the central banks’ cheap 
liquidity to invest in equities fueling the hy-
per-activities in the stock markets. The persis-
tence of central bank interest rates at the zero 
lower bound and the consecutive shift of major 
central banks to unconventional monetary pol-
icy has resulted in academic analysis of the 
distributional impacts, particularly of quantita-
tive easing. QE, in a narrow sense, is the ex-
pansion of central banks’ balance sheets by 
purchasing high quality, low risk premium 
bonds. It further comprises the purchase of 
lower quality, higher risk private bonds and the 
purchase of government bonds. Studies show 
that QE displays wide quantity, price, and 
structural effects on the balance sheets of fi-
nancial intermediaries and, to some extent, on 
the company and private household sector via 
a change in the supply of and demand for cred-
it and assets (Metzger/Young, forthcoming). 
Admittedly, there is no clear-cut picture on 
the distributional impacts on income and 
wealth inequality due to changes in asset pric-
es.  Arguments demonstrating a positive distri-
butional impact on income rest on the assump-
tion of the traditional monetary transmission 
mechanism. Due to reduced borrowing costs 
and increased credit supply, aggregate demand 
in the economy will also increase, resulting in 
a rise in both production and employment 
which will reduce income inequality. As a re-
sult, there are positive distributional effects 
over the medium term related to boosting ag-
gregate demand, lowering unemployment, and 
contributing to price stability, all of which tend 
to reduce inequality (ECB 2017: 50). 
However, taking into account the total 
economy, we raise reasonable doubts to the va-
lidity of the above cited arguments. According 
to Domanski et al., (2014), it is the boosting of 
equity prices which drives the wealth inequal-
ity in the eurozone in the course of unconven-
tional monetary policy. The reasoning, based 
on empirical survey and analysis, is twofold: 
first, equity prices have risen stronger on aver-
age than prices of other assets like bonds or 
real estate; and second, equities are highly 
concentrated in the top-income quintile. Both 
factors taken together cause a stronger increase 
in wealth inequality in comparison to other as-
set classes (Metzger/Young, forthcoming).
It is somewhat surprising that feminist po-
litical economists have paid little attention to 
the macroeconomic phenomenon such as how 
central banks’ monetary policies shape and 
structure gender relations across all levels of 
economic, political, social, and cultural life. 
This paper will analyze how the unconvention-
al monetary policies of central banks have pro-
duced unequal distributional outcomes be-
tween women and men, and thus increased 
177Young, B. Pap. Eur. 31(2) 2018: 175-185
gendered wealth inequality. Using the insight 
of feminist economics that gender is endoge-
nous to the economic process, Staveren (2011) 
suggests that there is an integrated two-way 
relationship between the economy and gender 
relations. In other words, the inequality in gen-
der relations can have negative effects on eco-
nomic policy and, at the same time, on eco-
nomic outcomes affecting men and women 
differently. Equally important is the insight of 
feminist economists that all social institutions 
and policies emanating from such organiza-
tions bear and transmit gender (as well as class 
and ethnic-based) biases (Elson 1991; Elson/
Catagay 2000; Young 2013). Borrowing from 
Elson, biases are inscribed in policy rules that 
limit the discretion of national policy makers 
with respect to fiscal, monetary, and financial 
sector policies. This often masks the ways in 
which financial governance operates to the dis-
advantage of women and reinforces gender in-
equality (Young et al., 2011; Young 2018).  
In the first part of the paper, I will provide a 
short introduction of the role of central banks 
and unconventional monetary policies of the 
Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the 
European Central Bank. This will include a 
discussion as to how Janet Yellen, the former 
Federal Reserve chair, and Yves Mersch, 
Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, 
address the distributional effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy and their suggestions 
for how to alleviate such unequal outcomes. 
This line of gender-blind economic argument 
is challenged in the second part of the paper by 
introducing concepts developed in feminist 
economics. Relying on Staveren (2011), I ar-
gue that gender is endogenous to the economic 
process, rather than interpreted as exogenous 
in terms of a sex-aggregated impact-variable. 
As a result, wealth inequality also has an im-
pact on macroeconomics, and thus may result 
in lower economic growth rates. This section 
then leads directly to the issue of asset bias in-
herent in the monetary policies of the central 
banks, arguing that while central bank policies 
may have gendered impacts, these are veiled 
and show up in labor market data or in fiscal 
policy of public expenditures. Finally, the pa-
per will use the results from the first wave of 
the Household Finance and Consumption Sur-
vey (HFCS) that was carried out by the Euro-
pean Central Bank and covers household level 
information on wealth, debt, income, and con-
sumption, from around 62,000 households in 
15 Euro-area countries. From this data-set, I 
extrapolate some gender impacts on how 
households allocate their assets, and how asset 
holdings are distributed among different 
households across 15 member states of the Eu-
ro-area. 
2. Quantitative Easing, Private Wealth, 
and Response by Central Bankers 
Central banks’ decision to start Quantitative 
Easing (QE) is highly controversial in terms 
of its effectiveness to stimulate the economy 
after the financial crisis starting in 2007. It 
was first enacted by the US-Federal Reserve 
in 2008 to buy treasury bonds and provide 
bail-outs for banks to avoid a depression-like 
collapse of the world economy. Between 2008 
and 2014, the FED enacted three Quantitative 
Easing programs. The Bank of England fol-
lowed with QE between 2009 and 2014 and 
introduced it once again after the Brexit vote 
in July 2016. In contrast to these early intro-
ductions of QE, the European Central Bank 
started the policy only in 2015. The reason for 
the unconventional programs was the lack of 
creditworthiness in interbank lending which 
meant that banks stopped lending to each oth-
er. In response, central banks provided liquid-
ity by buying commercial and asset-backed 
commercial papers (US and UK) and covered 
bonds in the Eurozone. These liquidity sup-
port measures extended not only the scope of 
existing central bank facilities by longer-term 
lending, it also meant that higher-risk and 
non-tradeable bank assets were accepted as 
collateral (Erturk 2014). 
Since the Maastricht Treaty prevented the 
ECB from outright acquiring public debt, the 
central bank started to provide unlimited li-
quidity to the Eurozone banks through its ‘en-
hanced credit support program’. At the start of 
the Eurozone crisis in May 2010, the ECB be-
gan buying limited quantities of government 
bonds under its Securities Market Program. 
Even these actions were insufficient to stem 
the rise of sovereign yields in Italy and Spain, 
which reached 7 per cent p.a as the crisis 
spread to other Eurozone peripheral countries. 
The ECB responded with its Long Term Refi-
nancing Operation (LTRO) to provide collater-
al loans of up to three years totaling about €1 
trillion. While the main goal was to reduce 
high yields of Eurozone government bonds in 
178 Young, B. Pap. Eur. 31(2) 2018: 175-185
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the liquidity 
was to provide cheap loans to banks in periph-
eral countries to lend to private companies and 
households to stimulate economic recovery 
(Erturk 2014). Despite the ECB’s unconven-
tional intervention, the Eurozone economy 
continued to stagnate.  
As the Eurozone inflation rate fell below 
zero in some countries in December 2014, the 
danger of deflation was no longer an abstract 
possibility. Following the UK and the US, the 
ECB started its own quantitative easing pro-
gram in March 2015. The central bank intend-
ed to buy bonds worth €60 billion a month, 
amounting to buying €1.1 trillion government 
bonds from March 2015 to September 2016 to 
benefit the region’s economies. At the same 
time, the ECB was cutting interest rates it 
charged on commercial loans to 0.05 percent 
down from 0.15 percent as long as banks com-
mitted to lending to companies and individu-
als. In order to force banks to provide loans to 
the private sector, the ECB imposed negative 
interest rates on parking banks’ money over-
night. As a result, government bond yields 
started to tumble from an already low point 
prior to embarking on quantitative easing, 
some even venturing into negative territory. As 
the EU economy started to flatten out again in 
the early months of 2016, Mario Draghi an-
nounced on March 10, 2016 further measures 
to calm the markets. Quantitative Easing was 
extended to buy corporate bonds, extend the 
amount of bonds bought each month from 
€60bn to €80bn, lower the fixed deposit rates 
from -0.3 to -0.4 per cent, and cut the main 
refinancing rate to 0 per cent (FT 11 March 
2016:1). This highly unusual situation implies 
that investors are actually paying for the privi-
lege to lend money to the banks. 
There is considerable disagreement among 
experts in terms of assessing the effectiveness 
of the quantitative easing program. The policy 
seems to have had a strong effect on the ex-
change rate, having weakened the euro-dollar 
exchange rate and lowered both the long-term 
interest rates to improve investment conditions 
and discourage savings and lowered the yields 
on sovereign bonds. However, it failed as a 
tool to increase inflation to the stated target of 
2 per cent. On the negative side, the fall in in-
terest rates has reduced the profitability of 
banks and thus banks’ profits (Demertzis and 
Wolff 2016), and has also led to virtually zero 
interest rate returns for bank deposit owners. 
Most important for this paper, the unconven-
tional monetary policy may have contributed 
to higher wealth inequality (Claeys, et al., 
2015). In response to the ECB announcement 
of quantitative easing, steep rallies in equities 
occurred. This was the case in 2014, when the 
stock market rallied almost 20 percent since 
mid-October, twice as much as the US S&P 
500 (Atkins et al., 2015); and the same hap-
pened after the March 2016 extension of QE 
(FT 11 March 2016). Ben Bernanke, the for-
mer Chair of the Federal Reserve, explained 
the rise in asset prices in a Brookings blog as 
follows:   
The claim that Fed policy has worsened inequali-
ty usually begins
with the (correct) observation that monetary ea-
sing works in part 
by raising asset prices, like stock prices. As the 
rich own more assets 
than the poor and the middle class, the reasoning 
goes, the Fed’s 
policies are increasing the already large dispari-
ties of wealth in 
the United States (Bernanke 2015).
As the link between monetary policy and 
ascending private wealth inequality became 
the object of academic and media criticism, Ja-
net Yellen, Federal Reserve Chair, and Yves 
Mersch, member of the Executive Board of the 
ECB, explained their positions at respective 
conferences. Janet Yellen spoke at the Confer-
ence on Economic Opportunity and Inequality 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and 
Yves Mersch gave a Keynote speech at the 
Corporate Credit Conference in Zurich, both 
on October 17, 2014. In her talk on ‘Perspec-
tives on Inequality and Opportunity from the 
Survey of Consumer Finance’, Yellen ac-
knowledged the widening inequality. The rea-
son she cited was that while the “stock market 
rebounded, wage growth and the healing of the 
labor market have been slow, and the increase 
in home prices has not fully restored the hous-
ing wealth lost by the large majority of house-
holds for which it is their primary asset” (Yel-
len 2014: 1). She referred to this as the ‘Great 
Gatsby Curve’ suggesting that greater income 
inequality is associated with diminished inter-
generational mobility. While Yellen cites a 
trove of negative data generated by the Federal 
Reserve’s triennial Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF), with specific details on income, 
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wealth, and debt for each of 6,000 household 
surveyed, she does not link this to the uncon-
ventional monetary policy of the Federal Re-
serve. This is surprising since she acknowledg-
es that wealth inequality has increased more 
than income inequality. In fact, the wealthiest 
5 percent of American households held 63 per 
cent of all wealth reported in the survey from 
2013 (in 1989 the figure was 54 per cent). In 
terms of financial assets, including stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds, and private pensions, the 
wealthiest 5 per cent held nearly two-thirds of 
all such assets in 2013, and the bottom half of 
households held just 2 per cent. Yellen’s solu-
tion to influence intergenerational mobility 
and trends in inequality is to increase econom-
ic opportunities. These include “four building 
blocks of opportunity”: two of them relate to 
education (early childhood and higher educa-
tion), the third source is ownership of private 
business, and the fourth opportunity speaks to 
inherited wealth. According to Janet Yellen, 
the culprit and solution for these wealth ine-
qualities is opportunities for the poorer strata 
of society. 
In contrast, Yves Mersch acknowledges 
that in times of exceptionally low interest 
rates and non-standard monetary policy 
measures there may be distributional effects, 
some resulting “in potential economic dam-
age to some parts of society; and the potential 
benefits for others” (Mersch 2014: 1). At the 
same time, he notes that central banks are not 
charged with the task of addressing inequali-
ties, nor are they responsible for economic 
justice for society as a whole. The clear man-
date of the ECB is to maintain price stability 
over the medium term. Nevertheless, he con-
cedes that monetary policy can have sizeable 
distributional effects, and this has largely 
been ignored in the theory and practice of 
monetary policy. The reason for why he en-
gages in the issue of inequality despite this 
has to do with the realization that distribu-
tional effects influence the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. He cites an example:
the impact of changes in interest rates on the con-
sumer spending 
of an individual household depend crucially on 
that household’s 
overall financial position. ….. Such differences 
have macroeconomic 
implications, as the economy’s overall response 
to policy changes 
will depend on the distribution  of assets, debt 
and income 
across households – especially in times of crisis, 
when economic 
shocks are large and unevenly distributed (p. 2).  
Inequality as a normative criterion does not 
play a role in Mersch’s defense of his address-
ing the issue; rather, he invokes an instrumen-
tal view of how such private wealth has macro-
economic implications (Fontan et al., 2015). 
He cites a study by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), which theoreti-
cally discusses five potential channels which 
may act as monetary transmission mechanisms 
in creating inequality. These include the in-
come position channel, the financial segmenta-
tion channel, the portfolio channel, saving re-
distribution channel, and earnings heterogene-
ity channel. Due to spatial limitations, the 
complex theoretical discussion of these chan-
nels cannot be repeated here. Suffice it to con-
clude that the different channels imply, at least 
at the theoretical level, ambiguous results in 
regard to the link between monetary policy 
and economic inequality. Nevertheless, 
Mersch concludes that non-conventional mon-
etary policy may have different effects on dif-
ferent parts of society. In particular, large-scale 
asset purchases seem to widen income ine-
quality. At the same time, non-conventional 
monetary policies of the ECB are necessary to 
guarantee price stability. The possible distribu-
tional side-effects are to be tolerated as collat-
eral effects. Since these policies engender 
great uncertainties, the non-standard monetary 
measures should therefore be temporary.  
3. Feminist Economic Insights: 
Unconventional Monetary Policy and 
Private Wealth Inequality 
Given the uncertainties in regard to the ef-
fects of unconventional monetary policies 
to ensure the credit-flow and thus stimulate 
economic growth, it is even more problem-
atic to tease out the gendered effects of such 
policies. While the role of money is one of 
the most important channels in the transmis-
sion between monetary policy and household 
wealth, it has remained the stepchild in ana-
lyzing macroeconomic transmission channels 
(Young 2010; 2002; 2018).  This has to do 
with the gender insensitivity that underpins 
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the policy discourses, beliefs, and norma-
tive assumptions of the banking community, 
who refuse to consider possible gender ine-
qualities as part of their monetary narrative. 
This silence reflects a set of assumptions that 
monetary policy and financial regulation, the 
key instruments of financial governance, are 
gender-neutral. Monetary policies focus on 
the economy as an aggregation of monetized 
stocks and flows. Even if finance economists 
and the finance community disregard gen-
dered norms and practices of their policies, 
studies on gender and finance demonstrate 
that monetary institutions and their policies 
are not gender-neutral. The silence about gen-
der is ‘strategic” (Bakker 1994) in the sense 
that this silence obscures the ways in which 
financial governance interacts with and re-
inforces the social organization of gender 
relations that prevail at different times and 
places. Mainstream finance economists and 
the banking policy community can thus dis-
regard feminist demands to analyze the gen-
dered norms and practices of their policies, 
since they see gender inequality as a social 
issue that should “remain outside the purview 
of monetary management” (Braunstein 2013: 
353). As such, it is not surprising that finance 
as an academic discipline and profession-
al practice is conceptualized independently 
from a moral and social context.
Feminist economists take issue with this 
gender-blind approach to financial govern-
ance. However, as Braunstein (2013) notes, 
there are only three studies dealing with mon-
etary policy and its effect on gendered employ-
ment outcomes. These studies deal with con-
ventional monetary policy and focus on re-
strictive interest rates and their implications 
for credit availability, which shapes business 
investment and affects social groups different-
ly (Braunstein/Heintz 2008; Tachtamanova/
Serminksa 2009; and Seguino/Heintz 2012). 
Other studies focus on the bond markets and 
their tools to “punish” states for fiscal profliga-
cy by pushing up borrowing costs on the capi-
tal markets. This can lead to weaker demand in 
the economy, reducing job creation, reducing 
public services, and increasing pressure on 
women’s unpaid work (Braunstein 2013, 
Heintz 2012). Except for Tachtamanova/Sier-
minska (2009), the aforementioned studies 
deal mostly with monetary policies in high-in-
come countries and analyze how they affect 
women in developing countries.  
Despite the paucity of research on standard 
as well as the recent unconventional monetary 
policy and gender relations, feminist econo-
mists have developed an integrated under-
standing of gender in economics. In particular, 
there are two theoretical contributions that 
may help disentangle the relations between un-
conventional monetary policy and gender ine-
quality: one, from van Staveren (2014), states 
that gender is endogenous to the economic 
process; and the other, from Elson (1991), 
states that there is a (male) bias that operates in 
favor of men as a gender and against women as 
a gender. Van Staveren proposes a two-way re-
lationship between gender and economic (fi-
nancial) relations. We should not just focus on 
the sex-aggregated impact of economic poli-
cies; equally important is to analyze the impact 
of gender inequality on macroeconomic 
growth rates. Just as monetary policy has dis-
tributional effects which can have macroeco-
nomic impacts, so is gender inequality ineffi-
cient in the allocation of financial resources 
and may inflict losses on aggregate growth. 
Discrimination against women in the financial 
markets is thus not only unfair, but also ineffi-
cient at the macroeconomic level. In fact, this 
line of argument is quite similar to Yves 
Mersch (2014) explaining why central bankers 
should engage in the distributional aspect of 
unconventional monetary policy. As pointed 
out previously, Mersch suggests that differenc-
es in terms of the distribution of assets, debt, 
and income across households have macroeco-
nomic implications. Central bankers have  an 
interest in the distribution of income and 
wealth in a society despite their primary man-
date to maintain price stability. 
However, Mersch’s logic leaves out any 
reference to gender biases which, according to 
Elson (1991), are inscribed in institutions and 
policy rules. Biases, whether they are gender, 
class, or racialized, impact and often distort 
distributional outcomes favoring some mem-
bers in society over others. Unlike neoclassical 
or Keynesian economics, feminist economists 
start from the assumption that monetary policy 
is not just a technical issue at the disposal of 
central banks to influence the rate of interest 
and investment and thereby economic growth. 
Gendered institutions have an impact on finan-
cial markets through the savings rate, interest 
rate, and investment. If gender bias constrains 
women’s investments as a result of discrimina-
tory practices at lending institutions, it will not 
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only lower the incentives for women as bor-
rowers, it can lead to aggregate lower savings 
rates. As van Staveren suggests, treating gen-
der as an impact variable is important, but it is 
far too limiting to treat gender as only an im-
pact variable in economics and finance. “Good 
economic analysis also includes questions on 
how social inequalities, such as gender, affect 
micro- and macro-economic behavior, varia-
bles, relationships, and policy effectiveness” 
(Van Staveren 2014: 32). 
The next section will extrapolate some gen-
der biases from a study done by the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2014) utilizing data from the Eu-
ropean Central Bank Survey on how house-
holds allocate their assets and how asset hold-
ings are distributed among different house-
holds across fifteen member states of the Euro 
area. The data from the ECB Survey does not 
include the impact of QE on households, since 
QE only started in 2015 in the eurozone. Nev-
ertheless, the Survey should catch the distribu-
tional effects of the rising asset prices due to 
unconventional monetary policies enacted pri-
or to QE. 
4. Unconventional ECB Monetary Policy 
and the Gendered Wealth Effect (Asset Bias)
The Discussion Paper (Deutsche Bank 
12/2014) utilizes the results from the House-
hold Finance and Consumption Survey 
(HFCS) of 2011 of  62,558 net samples of 
households across 15 euro-area countries. The 
authors’ intent is to analyze how households 
choose to allocate their wealth across assets 
classes and ask if there is a systematic relation-
ship between underlying household character-
istics and asset holding patterns across coun-
tries. The survey covers household-level infor-
mation on net wealth, asset and debt holding, 
and income, as well as on household compo-
sition. Asset categories are divided into hous-
ing assets, risky financial assets (mutual funds, 
bonds and shares), safe financial assets (depos-
its, life insurance, private pension plans), and 
business wealth. In terms of socio-economic 
characteristics, the study includes the follow-
ing traits: household types (couples without 
children; adults without children; single parent 
households; couples with children; adults with 
children), gender (male or female);  age (40-64 
years, or 65 and older); marital status (married, 
divorced, or widowed); labor market status 
(self-employed, unemployed, retired, or oth-
er); education (middle or high); inheritance; 
net wealth distribution and income distribution 
(base: first quintile, second quintile, third quin-
tile, fourth quintile or fifth quintile). 
Whilethe HFCS permits researchers to 
study the allocation of wealth across different 
household types, the data is not individualized, 
but aggregated at the household level. In other 
words, the value of the reference person ap-
plies to the entire household making it difficult 
to ascertain the intra-household distribution of 
wealth and the decision-making power within 
such households. As a result, there may be a 
selection bias as to whether men or women 
head these households (Schneebaum et al., 
2014: 21). The Deutsche Bank study is further 
limited in that the gender reference person 
across the socio-economic variables is male. 
As a result, the gender bias in terms of the par-
ticipation in risky assets calculated from a pro-
bit model (probability model) can only be in-
ferred by making some assumptions. Never-
theless, it is pretty safe to assume that, on aver-
age: single parents are more often females than 
males; lower education level is more common 
among women; and women have less wealth 
and income (lower quintiles of wealth and in-
come distribution). That female single house-
holds have less wealth than males is corrobo-
rated by Schneebaum et al. (2014). In fact, 
their study is the first analyzing a gendered 
wealth effect across euro-area countries. It pre-
sents evidence that both male and female sin-
gle households own less net wealth than cou-
ple households, but the difference between 
male and female households is large and statis-
tically significant. Female households hold 
about €319,000 less wealth than couple house-
holds, while male households own about 
€176,000 less than couple households. When 
other socio-economic variables are included in 
the model, such as comparing households with 
the same structure in terms of the presence and 
age of children and relationship status of the 
reference person, male households still have 
more wealth than female households. The 
same holds for age and education, the gender 
wealth gap remains statistically significant. 
The authors tentatively conclude from their 
study on the Gender Wealth Gap in Europe 
that on average, even when comparing male 
and female households with the same observa-
ble characteristics, female households have 
less wealth (Schneebaum et al., 2014: 15-17). 
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If we now return to the research paper of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank, the results show a 
similar concentration of wealth at the top end 
of the wealth distribution across the 15 euro 
area countries. 50 percent of households either 
below or just at the median level hold 12 per 
cent of the net wealth, while the top decile 
holds 50 per cent of net wealth. Most house-
holds in the euro area hold the majority of their 
wealth in the form of primary residence (41 
per cent in Germany to 61 per cent in Italy and 
the Netherlands). Wealthier households tend to 
participate in a wider range of asset classes and 
are more likely to own real estate, risky assets, 
and private business. In terms of investing in 
financial risky assets, the study shows both 
participation and a high level of variation 
across the Euro-area countries in the level of 
risky asset investment. It is not altogether sur-
prising that in comparison to other asset class-
es, the participation share in risky financial 
assets is the least important category in aver-
age terms, ranging from 1 per cent in Cyprus 
and Slovenia to 11 per cent in Belgium. The 
same is true for wealth being held in safe fi-
nancial assets (Netherlands 22 per cent of 
gross wealth whereas in Italy 6 per cent and 4 
per cent in Slovenia). In general, few house-
holds hold risky financial assets, which the au-
thors of the Deutsche Bank study call the 
“stock-market participation puzzle” referring 
to the behavior of people who  leave their 
money in deposit accounts (with low interest 
rates) rather than invest in equities. However, 
the low percentage of participation in risky as-
sets increases with wealth. It ranges between 8 
per cent in Slovakia and 67 per cent in Finland 
in the fifth net wealth quintile (Deutsche Bun-
desbank 2014: 5-10). 
For the present argument of discovering an 
asset bias, a phenomenon which would show 
whether males as a reference person, the better 
educated, those with higher income, or those 
that own inheritance are more likely to invest 
in risky financial assets. This would indicate 
that the target group would benefit from an in-
crease in the value of shares, bonds, and mutu-
al funds due to the unconventional monetary 
policies of the ECB.  The results suggest that 
wealth and income distribution are both signif-
icantly correlated with the amount of exposure 
to risky financial assets, especially in the high-
er quintile. As pointed out above, the percent-
age of participation in risky financial assets 
increases with wealth. This holds for the Euro 
area and for most member countries (Deutsche 
Bank 2014: 20). In terms of risky assets, the 
lowest wealth quintile owns 3 percent, where-
as the top 5 percent owns 55 per cent. If we 
take males as  a reference person, they are 
more likely to participate in risky financial as-
sets in 12 of euro-area member states; except 
for Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands (not 
statistically significant except for Malta). In 
terms of single parent households (presumably 
there are more women in this category across 
the 15 euro member states), there is less likeli-
hood that they participate in risky financial as-
sets in 12 of the 15 member states. Households 
with the highest level of education have in-
vestments in risky assets at a rate four times 
higher than lower educated households. This 
correlation is even stronger in countries such 
as Austria, Germany, Spain, Greece, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, and Slovenia, where highly 
educated households hold about ten times 
more risky financial assets in comparison to 
households where the reference person has a 
low level of education. Inheritance and higher 
income are also associated with greater de-
mand for risky financial assets. “Higher in-
come and higher wealth are associated with 
greater demand for risky assets and, for given 
entry or participation costs, greater probability 
of overcoming the threshold and deciding that 
it is worthwhile to enter the asset market or re-
main in it” (p. 16). At the same time, while the 
share of risky financial asset holders rises 
sharply with net wealth, it stays surprisingly 
low even for the highest net wealth deciles (p. 
27). However, this could change rapidly as in-
terest rates turn negative and returns on bank 
deposits equal close to zero. 
5. Conclusion    
Unconventional monetary policy of central 
banks in core capitalist countries, while not 
exclusively triggered by unconventional mon-
etary policy, has had a profound impact in rais-
ing asset prices, nevertheless. To my knowl-
edge, there are no studies inquiring whether 
these non-standard monetary policies have 
different distributional effects between wom-
en and men. Feminist economists and gender 
studies have warned for some time that poor-
er, low-skilled single mothers are on average 
more affected by income inequality, poverty, 
and social exclusion. The intent of the paper 
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was to interrogate whether unconventional 
monetary policy of central banks may have a 
gender bias that operates in favor of men as 
gender and against women as gender. For this 
purpose, insights of feminist economics helped 
to disentangle the link between gender inequal-
ity and monetary policy. Important in this en-
deavor is van Staveren’s theoretical contribu-
tion that gender is endogenous to the economic 
process, by which she suggests that gender in-
equality can also have negative effects on eco-
nomic growth; and Elson’s (1991) insight of 
gender bias, which demonstrates that monetary 
policy is not gender neutral. These two feminist 
theoretical insights are important for economics 
generally insofar as they stipulate that gender 
inequality and gender biases can negatively 
influence macroeconomic variables. Despite 
these tendential impacts, gender as an endoge-
nous process remains largely neglected and un-
dertheorized in traditional economics. 
In order to extrapolate the gender bias from 
unconventional monetary policy, the paper re-
lied on the results of the Household Finance 
and Consumption Survey (HFCS) of over 
62,000 household across 15 euro-area coun-
tries. While the results are tentative, neverthe-
less, they show that single parent households 
(presumably comprised of more women), the 
less educated, and those in the lower wealth 
and income quintile participate much less in 
investing in risky assets. The lowest wealth 
quintile owns only 3 percent whereas the top 5 
per cent owns 55 per cent. These results are 
corroborated by Schneebaum et al., (2014) 
analysis of the gender wealth gap using the 
Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
data. They find that households with only one 
male adult have more net wealth than house-
holds with one female adult, and that house-
holds with an adult couple have the highest net 
wealth. This insight into the gender wealth gap 
is therefore important for this paper, since 
monetary easing works in part by raising asset 
prices. Furthermore, since the rich own more 
assets than the poor, these monetary policies 
benefit the wealthier quintile (on average, 
comprised of more men) at the expense of the 
poorer strata of society (on average, comprised 
of more women). 
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